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Kinship as an Assertion of Sovereign Native Nationhood
Abstract
As a concept, the nation is maddeningly difficult to define. Like “spirit” or “health”, the term “nation”
encompasses a multiplicity of meanings that shift depending on the context. John Carlos Rowe has argued
that the “...use of the word national ...refers to a complex and irreducible array of discourses, institutions,
policies, and practices which, even if they are in flux or in competition with other structures and allegiances,
cannot be easily wished away.”[i] Despite its fluid and constructed nature, the nation is nevertheless quite real
and has had, since its inception, power to order the world.[ii] Because the word has such a multiplicity of
meanings, I use the term in a broad sense, to refer to a collectivity with political autonomy recognized by
others outside of the scope of its influence. Exploring exactly how Native peoples understood their own
collective sociopolitical organization sheds light on the multiple and often contradictory understandings that
Europeans and Americans developed to define Native nations and the ambiguous actions government officials
often took in relation to them.[iii] Euro-Americans recognized that Native people organized themselves as
coherent political entities but interpreted these collectivities through Western political constructions.
[i] John Carlos Rowe, ed., Post-nationalist American Studies (Berkley: University of California Press, 2000) 2.
[ii] To understand the power of the concept of the nation to order social, political, geographic, and cultural
organization, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983).
[iii] I will use the term “American” throughout to refer to a person who identifies him or herself with the
political entity of the United States, accepting membership in the nation regardless of race or heritage.
Although I employ this term, I recognize that historically the term “American” can sometimes become a
monolithic reference that either subsumes or erases the existence of neighboring nations, such as Mexico and
Canada. I have chosen the term “American” for its ease of use and employ it in a very specific sense. The term,
as I use it, refers to all people who imagine themselves to be a part of what Benedict Anderson terms the deep,
horizontal comradeship of the nation. See Anderson, Imagined Communities. I am not simply talking about
people whom the United States recognizes as citizens, but all people who claim membership in the nation. At
a certain point in history, American Indian people also become Americans in the way that I use the term.
However, American Indian membership and citizenship in the United States is complicated by their
continuing membership and citizenship in their own nations.
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 “As I use [the term tribe] and as I understand other Indian people using it, it 
means a group of people living pretty much in the same place who know who their 
relatives are.”  -- Vine Deloria, Jr. 
 
As a concept, the nation is maddeningly difficult to define.  Like “spirit” or 
“health”, the term “nation” encompasses a multiplicity of meanings that shift depending 
on the context.  John Carlos Rowe has argued that the “...use of the word national ...refers 
to a complex and irreducible array of discourses, institutions, policies, and practices 
which, even if they are in flux or in competition with other structures and allegiances, 
cannot be easily wished away.”i   Despite its fluid and constructed nature, the nation is 
nevertheless quite real and has had, since its inception, power to order the world.ii 
Because the word has such a multiplicity of meanings, I use the term in a broad sense, to 
refer to a collectivity with political autonomy recognized by others outside of the scope 
of its influence.  Exploring exactly how Native peoples understood their own collective 
sociopolitical organization sheds light on the multiple and often contradictory 
understandings that Europeans and Americans developed to define Native nations and the 
ambiguous actions government officials often took in relation to them.iii  Euro-Americans 
recognized that Native people organized themselves as coherent political entities but 
interpreted these collectivities through Western political constructions.  Although 
American understandings of Native nations have shifted over time, they have mainly 
been based on Western assumptions that all valid political formations mirror those of the 
nation-state.  As the nation-state emerged and took precedence over other political forms, 
Europeans and Americans began to view Native sociopolitical organization as either 
comparable to the nation-state in form—even ascribing it political autonomy—or as 
chaotic and formless, and therefore opposed to the nation-state.  Neither representation 
accurately reflected Native nationhood in its multiple forms.  I seek to unravel the 
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distinctions between the nation-state as it was first defined in Western Europe and North 
America and the nationhood found among Native peoples of North America. 
 Assuming that Native sociopolitical organization and interaction mirrors the rigid 
constructions of the state both ignores the complexity of Native historical action and it 
also glosses this complexity in a way that benefits the U.S. nation’s hegemonic narrative.  
According to such a narrative, if Plains peoples are divided into nation-like tribes with a 
unified membership and a bounded territory then a successful military campaign against a 
tribe results in the capture of the territory and in control over the population.iv  If tribes 
were bounded like nations, they could be conquered and controlled.  Conversely, if 
Native peoples were chaotic with minimal or unbounded political organization, they 
required subjugation and assimilation under the civilizing structure of the state.v  The 
dominant narrative of U.S. history has included American Indians since before the 
earliest days of the United States, but has supported U.S. hegemony by telling the story 
from the perspective of the state.vi  When scholarship considers Native perspectives, 
including the relationship between Native sociopolitical organization and Native 
historical action, the narratives of the same historical moments found in hegemonic 
tellings have the power to challenge the nationalist and empirical ideological 
presumptions of the United States.   
In order to begin to develop a scholarly discussion of American Indian culture and 
history from a Native perspective, we must not only recognize the cracks in the idea of 
the nation-state as applied to Native peoples, but we must also develop a new scholarly 
understanding of Native collective assertions of sovereignty centered in Native 
understandings of social organization.  For American Indian peoples today, sovereignty 
has taken on a specific meaning through the contestations with the United States over the 
extent of Native political autonomy recognized by the state.  While I acknowledge the 
importance of specificity for current political issues, I use the term more broadly to refer 
to an autonomous self-governing political entity that may also construct a distinctive 
cultural identity. In order to do this, I explore the Cheyenne nation as a case study to help 
illuminate a nationhood that exercises sovereignty without relying on the mechanisms 
used by the state.  Both the terms “nation” and “sovereignty” are problematic in such an 
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endeavor because of their current association with the political mechanisms of the nation-
state.vii  Nevertheless, I suggest that sociopolitical processes other than those that depend 
on bounded categories can establish a political organization with the autonomy associated 
with the term “nation.”   
Benedict Anderson argued that members of the nation-state imagine themselves 
as a homogenous collective.  One citizen is essentially equivalent to another through the 
mass distribution of print media, allowing citizens to imagine the nation-state as 
homogenous and bounded and also reproducible globally.viii  American Indian peoples 
certainly do not imagine themselves in this way.  In fact, they are adamant about not 
being reproducible; however, they certainly do imagine themselves as collectivities.  
Markers that scholars have used to distinguish Native nations like language, religion, or 
territory can be used to assert collective identity depending on context, but the medium 
that people use consistently use to imagine themselves as part of a larger whole is 
kinship.  Similar to print media in the nation-state, kinship builds a network that extends 
beyond the family or the band—often even beyond known relatives—allowing members 
to imagine themselves as part of a collectivity.  You know you are Cheyenne because 
your relatives are Cheyenne.  You may also have Lakota relative but this usually plays 
out as something akin to dual citizenship, and you are Cheyenne if you live with your 
Cheyenne relatives and Lakota if you live with Lakota relatives.  Such an identity can 
shift if the circumstances in your life demand it.  What results is a collective socio-
political group that is highly flexible and fluid because its membership is relatively open 
to those who can access it through familial relations of some type.  Kinship is the main 
metaphor that is used when Cheyenne people talk about how they know they are 
Cheyenne.   
The nation-state exercises its sovereignty by enforcing the boundaries it 
constructs both on territory and also on the person through legal and social contracts, and 
it determines both national and international political and economic action in relation to 
these boundaries.  I propose that alternatively a Native nation exercised sovereignty by 
maintaining a web of kin-based relationships and strategically activating these 
relationships to take political and economic action and to access territory.ix  Certainly, as 
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R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead argue, indigenous peoples respond 
pragmatically to changing conditions, including the dramatic changes that accompanied 
contact with state societies including the dramatic changes that accompanied contact with 
state societies, even if this means discarding previous social formations.x  I argue, 
however, that Native peoples do not necessarily overhaul their sociopolitical organization 
to accommodate state encroachment; more often they respond to shifting circumstances 
by adjusting already flexible formations to meet the needs of the moment.  By 
emphasizing the role of kinship in articulating and maintaining the Cheyenne nation, I 
use this case study to demonstrate that Native nations of the Plains were historically 
grounded in institutions constructed differently from those of the state, revealing an 
indigenous sovereignty that has neither emerged as a response to colonialism or depended 
on the confines of the state. 
 
Imagining American Indian Nations Through the Legal Presumptions of the State   
The political sovereignty of American Indian nations has most commonly been 
understood as emerging from a historical process between European and American 
nation-states and Native peoples.  This assumes some pre-existing sociopolitical 
organization that is then classified as sovereign by Western powers.  The federal 
government of the United States has categorized American Indian peoples as members of 
their own nations from its inception, even while recognizing varying degrees of sovereign 
status depending on historical circumstances.  This is demonstrated by the fact that the 
United States constructed its interactions with Native peoples as nation-to-nation 
relationships and in turn encoded this construction into the policies and laws of the state.  
The nation-to-nation relationship established between the United States and American 
Indian peoples continued the relationship Great Britain already established on the 
assumption that Native nations were sovereign.xi   For example, because the Iroquois 
helped to defeat the French during the Seven Years War, Great Britain recognized the 
national status of several large Native groups in the area and their rights to large pieces of 
territory.xii   The United States continued the practice of recognizing Native sovereignty 
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after the Revolutionary War, particularly because they were interested in maintaining 
certain Native nations as military allies.xiii      
When the United States formed its own nation, it recognized the sovereignty of 
Native nations in its founding documents, delineating the relationship between itself and 
these nations in the United States Constitution.xiv  David Wilkins demonstrated that 
Native nations have an extraconstitutional status in relation to the United States because 
they were defined as distinctive polities in the Constitution and this was affirmed through 
treaties.xv  In this way, American Indian nations were originally constructed in U.S. law 
as independent political entities that could rationally enter into relationships with nation-
states, even though they were not always categorized as foreign nations.  
xviii
The epistemology and the political constructions of Native nationhood in 
American legal and cultural discourse, however, have changed during the course of the 
nineteenth century.  The recognition of certain American Indian political bodies as 
sovereign has held up throughout the history of the United States, although it has often 
been under attack.xvi  For example, long after the United States established a nation-state 
on the North American continent, American Indian peoples maintained control over their 
own legal and political systems.  Native nations made their own legal and political 
decisions, regulating themselves entirely, until Congress passed the Seven Major Crimes 
Act in 1885.xvii  Furthermore, the U.S. negotiation of treaties with American Indian 
peoples indisputably demonstrates that the government considered Native peoples to be 
sovereign entities.    Although federal and local government officials have often 
broken treaties, these documents have never been fully discarded as markers of Native 
sovereign status.  While American history has often constructed Indian peoples as 
conquered peoples, the United States did not deal with them as such for most of the 
nineteenth century; instead they negotiated with them as sovereign entities through 
treaties.  
Today, when Native peoples, scholars, or legal and political officials in the United 
States refer to American Indian nations as sovereign, they are often referring to a specific 
legal status conferred by the state.  This status currently grants important political powers 
and access to federal resources.  Native sovereignty, however, has not always taken this 
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form.  David Wilkins and Tsianina Lomawaima have argued that Native sociopolitical 
bodies have always been sovereign entities and that this sovereignty is inherent. They 
stated that although scholars may delineate various specific criteria for distinguishing a 
sovereign entity from some other form of human organization, inherent sovereignty 
always inheres in self-governing groups.xix   The sovereignty of Native nations existed 
before the founding of the United States, before the drafting of the Constitution, and it 
continues to exist outside of the state or the Constitution.xx   Although the United States 
has recognized the sovereignty of some Native peoples within its borders, the sovereignty 
of these nations does not depend on this recognition.   
 
Imagining American Indian Nations Through the Epistemological Presumptions of Social 
Science 
 During the eighteenth century, scholars also began to adopt the idea that 
American Indians organized themselves politically as tribal nations.  This did not 
necessarily carry an assumption of sovereignty, however, but was instead based on the 
idea of a tribe as a bounded ethnic unit.  As Eric Wolf has demonstrated, scholars 
developed a bounded understanding of human social organization with the rise of the 
social sciences.  As part of this epistemological shift, scholars came to endow “nations, 
societies, or cultures with the qualities of internally homogenous and externally 
distinctive and bounded objects” and thus it became “easy to sort the world.”xxi  As 
anthropology and sociology were gaining academic legitimacy, scholars of these 
disciplines began to embrace the widely held notion of the Indian tribe as bounded in a 
manner resembling the nation-state while lacking the political institutions of the state.   
xxiii
The term “tribe” as it has been used to refer to a type of human group has been 
defined in such multiple ways over time that it has developed an ambiguous meaning.  
Despite its varied use, however, its usage reveals nation-state assumptions about the 
nature of social organization.xxii  Susan Sharrock demonstrated that scholars have 
presumed that tribes were bounded, homogenous entities, noting that scholars represented 
them as composed of members “of one ethnic identity who spoke a common language 
and shared a common lifeway in contiguous territories.”    In his discussion of the 
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concept of “tribe,” Morton H. Fried noted that Lewis Henry Morgan applied this kind of 
bounded definition to the Iroquois, and even extended it to “the great body of the 
American aborigines.”xxiv  Fried distilled Morgan’s definition into a group of multiple kin 
units that shared a language, territory, name, and structural government.xxv  In Morgan’s 
original definition, the similarity between tribe and nation are clear—both are defined by 
a set of limiting categories such as language, territory, and political organization that act 
to delineate a specific named entity.  Fried also noted that ethnographers have tended 
towards representing the tribe as “a reality transcending time,” that maintained integrity 
and homogeneity throughout history.xxvi  Again such representations parallel 
constructions of the nation-state as eternal, emerging from a condition of purity, and 
made up of a diverse population unified in national purpose and recast as homogenous.   
As Sharrock and Fried have demonstrated, the tribe was imagined as a political 
community that was limited, bounded, and emerged from a relationship with a particular, 
bounded landscape that produced a distinct ethnicity, even if it did not necessarily 
produce rational citizens.  By the turn of the twentieth century, the concept of nation as 
bounded and homogenous so thoroughly governed scholarly thought on human 
organization that it generated a totalizing explanation for human groupings, including 
those that clearly lacked state structured societies.  According to the thought of the time, 
all human communities could be clearly categorized into entities reflective of the nation-
state that were uniform in language and culture and spatially bounded.  In keeping with 
this line of thought, scholarship of this period claimed that American Indian tribes were 
no different.  
 
The Cheyenne as a Tribal Nation: Representations and Interpretations 
Because the concept of nation as a bounded, uniform entity had become 
naturalized as the only way to order human organization, early anthropologists and 
historians studying American Indian communities had no inclination to critique the 
bounded construction of tribe as an outgrowth of this ideology.  Moreover, early scholars 
of Cheyenne culture and history rarely challenged this model and often embraced it even 
when they were aware of its contradictions and inflexibility.  Although this conception of 
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tribe grew out of a comparison of Native social organization with that of the nation-state, 
it effectively erased American Indian sovereignty and political agency, imagining 
American Indian collective identity as entirely related to culture.  To conceive of Native 
group identity in terms of the Western nation-state denies the people an intellectual 
sovereignty to exist as a nation on completely different terms.  
xxvii
xxviii
  Even the most definitive scholarship on the Cheyenne has drawn on nation-state 
presumptions to understand the people.  Perhaps the clearest example of this perspective 
can be traced through the writings of George Bird Grinnell, who presented the Cheyenne 
as a unified tribal people in his scholarship.    He did not actually name the Cheyenne 
as a nation, but he laid out their history in a clearly nationalist light.  In his ethnographies, 
Grinnell reconstructed the many different groups that came together over time to form the 
Cheyenne, noting that these groups once had been considered separate entities.   He 
even noted that, “the Cheyennes have among them a strong infusion of foreign blood.”xxix  
Nevertheless, in his ethnographies, Grinnell portrayed the Cheyenne as a unified ethnic 
group with bounded and distinct cultural traits, based on a shared language and religion.  
For Grinnell, the Cheyenne—like many nation-states—were not a people until the bands 
united.xxx  Once he could identify the sociopolitical body of a unified Cheyenne tribe, he 
wrote about the tribe as culturally singular, rarely even distinguishing between Northern 
and Southern peoples.xxxi 
xxxii
 Writing in the mid-twentieth century, E. Adamson Hoebel, did directly identify 
the Cheyenne as a nation.  He opened his ethnographic text on the Cheyenne by 
describing their migration onto the plains and then discussed the diverse peoples that 
came together to form as one group.  He then declared the Cheyenne to be a stable, 
unified nation by 1800, but stated that from 1830 onward  “the solidarity of the 
Cheyennes was stretched thin by the great distances separating the northernmost from the 
southernmost bands.”   In Hoebel’s conception, the Cheyenne nation existed only for a 
brief historical moment because it could not maintain unity across its vast territory 
despite the people’s mobility.  Although, like Grinnell, Hoebel indicated that both the 
membership of the Cheyenne nation and the boundary of the nation itself were flexible, 
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he only described the Cheyenne as a nation during the period he believed that the people 
were continuously unified and ethnically and culturally discrete.   
xxxiii
xxxiv
Hoebel used a nationalist understanding of unity to describe the Cheyenne people, 
arguing that specific institutions brought the people together in common understanding.  
If the people no longer held ceremonies together, and more importantly for Hoebel, if 
they no longer made political and legal decisions together, they were no longer unified as 
one nation.    He argued that the 1851 treaty, in which the United States distinguished 
between the Northern and the Southern Cheyenne, demonstrated that the Cheyenne had 
split in two and lost their national unity.   Hoebel was clearly bounded by his 
deployment of the nation-state model, leading to his assertion that the Cheyenne could 
only sustain national unity for approximately thirty years.  
xxxvi
Unlike Hoebel, Donald Berthrong and Peter Powell were not explicit in their use 
of a national model to describe Cheyenne social organization.  Instead, their scholarship 
is marked by the absence of addressing the nature Cheyenne social organization.  In this 
absence, both authors continued to assume the Cheyenne nation parallels the nation-state.  
For example, Berthrong pointed to Cheyenne government and religion as unifying 
national institutions.xxxv  Thus religion and government became institutions that establish 
the boundaries of the tribe.  Powell also pointed to Cheyenne religious and political 
organizations as defining criteria for demonstrating that the Cheyenne people were a 
unified tribe.   Nevertheless, he failed to describe the ways that the Cheyenne 
understood themselves as one people beyond these objective criteria.  Both authors also 
use the term “tribe” without qualifying it, demonstrating an uncritical acceptance of a 
bounded understanding of Cheyenne sociopolitical organization.  The absence of a 
detailed description of the nature of Cheyenne sociopolitical organization and the use of 
limiting criteria to define the group suggests that both authors continue to assume a 
nation-state model in their histories of the Cheyenne people.    
Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel also address the nature of Cheyenne 
sociopolitical organization in their seminal work, The Cheyenne Way, which seeks to 
illuminate Cheyenne legal systems.  These authors argue that although many Plains 
peoples had amorphous political composition, the Cheyenne possessed a unified political 
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system constituting a council of chiefs and the military societies.xxxvii
xxxviii
  The chief’s 
council, or the Council of Forty-Four, had legal authority to determine political action 
and regulation and to dole out punishment to those who overstepped the bounds.  The 
military societies had the power to enforce order, particularly at times when the bands 
came together in large encampments for a summer buffalo hunt or the Sun Dance.  So the 
authors point to unifying political institutions, but they also claim that the majority of 
Cheyenne people were versed in the legal expectations of the nation and that the act of 
exercising law and determining justice was not merely confined to these institutions and 
their members.   Llewellyn and Hoebel certainly viewed the Cheyenne as a 
homogenous and bounded sociopolitical group, often comparing it to modern nations, but 
they also suggested that the flexibility of the system and the ability of its members to 
interpret and shape its institutions to the needs of the moment gave the collectivity a 
certain resiliency in asserting political autonomy.  
xxxix
 In his book, The Cheyenne Nation, John Moore recognized the limitations that 
tightly integrated models of Cheyenne sociopolitical organization have had for 
delineating Cheyenne sovereignty.  Moore emphasized a more continuous and flexible 
Cheyenne nationhood, demarcating it as a “tribal nation” and defining the nation in terms 
of a distinct territory, citizenship, political unity, and language.    To separate his 
understanding of the Cheyenne nation from older interpretations, Moore described 
Cheyenne social organization in great detail.  He emphasized its flexibility and the value 
placed on incorporating outsiders.  He also related the history of the many tribal divisions 
and mergers. Moore emphasized the complexity of the Cheyenne nation when he stated, 
It is misleading, I think, to claim that the strength of the Cheyenne nation lay 
in its tight political integration, its homogeneity, and its maintenance of ethnic 
boundaries.  I believe it is much more accurate to say that the political and 
military strength of the Cheyennes lay in their dispersal across broad reaches 
of the central plains, their economic and productive specializations, and their 
special trade relationships and intermarriages with neighboring groups.xl  
 
He believed that such a flexible social system, which allowed bands to disperse and to 
incorporate outsiders for benefits of trade and alliance, helped form and strengthen the 
Cheyenne nation.  
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In assigning the Cheyenne a national status, however, he could not escape the 
definitions constructed by the Western nation-state.  He continued to imagine Cheyenne 
nationhood in terms of nation-state presumptions: as based on certain bounded and 
unchanging cultural and political institutions. John Moore has argued that a set of 
common understandings unified the Cheyenne people.  Such understandings included 
their shared sense of territory, their alliances against common enemies, and their 
communication with a single language.xli  Although he allowed for flexibility and 
complexity within the tribal nation, adding important new insights to the study of 
Cheyenne history, ultimately he represented the outer boundaries of the Cheyenne as 
rigid, assuming that people were incorporated under a discretely defined and bounded 
Cheyenne nation.  Although Moore recognized the importance of social relations for the 
Cheyenne, his emphasis on state-based conceptions of the nation led him to a definition 
of tribal nation that remained too rigid to reflect the full flexibility of Cheyenne socio-
political organization.   
 In alignment with the Western standard for representing American Indian nations 
in the United States, scholars have represented the Cheyenne as a tribe, uniform in 
membership and culture, and bounded by a vast but spatially distinct territory.  Yet at the 
same time, these authors recognized that the Cheyenne did not completely fit a bounded 
and homogenous model.  They all acknowledged that the Cheyenne nation was not a 
continuously bounded, uniform cultural, political, or social entity.  Thus, although these 
scholars have delineated internal tribal divisions and external intertribal relations, they 
failed to question the assumption that the Cheyenne resembled the nation-state, using the 
term “tribe” and sometimes even using the term “nation” uncritically. 
 
Reconsidering “Tribe”: Questioning the Naturalness of the Nation-State 
 Viewing Native nations as tribes has provided both scholars and government 
officials with a set of categories that facilitated their efforts to contain, define, and control 
Native peoples.  Yet American perceptions of the American Indian tribe reflected a 
certain ambiguity about acknowledging the sovereign status of Native nations, present in 
both U.S. policy and scholarship about American Indian peoples.  Throughout the history 
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of the United States, officials representing the government have treated Indian people as 
both members of their own tribal nations and as irrational non-citizens who should be 
incorporated into the American nation.xlii  Regardless, both depictions reflect conceptions 
of American Indian peoples through the lens of the nation-state, but these portrayals can 
either define Native peoples as parallel to the nation-state for purposes of containment or 
as contradictory to the nation-state for the purpose of control.  Representing Indian 
peoples as tribal nations provides an ambiguity that allows both scholars and officials to 
designate them either as bounded entities with a uniform membership, culture, and 
territory like the state or as chaotic, boundless, irrational entities lacking national 
formation depending on the agenda of the moment.  Both constructions legitimate the 
state’s domination of Native nations. If Native peoples are easily delineated tribal 
nations, their territory could be won or conquered and their people incorporated into the 
conquering nation.  If Native peoples are nationless and therefore assumed to lack 
political formation, the state can justify control and assimilation of chaotic peoples within 
its borders through institutions like the military, the church, or the education system.  
xliii
Although political representatives of the United States often imagined Native 
peoples as nations, they did not consistently treat Native nations as politically sovereign. 
Because the nation-state strives for uniformity within its borders, the United States has 
used the apparatus of the state to control all peoples that live inside its boundaries.  
Therefore, sovereign Native nations have often been viewed as incompatible with the 
state. During the nineteenth century, the anxiety steadily increased in the United States 
concerning the establishment of U.S. sovereignty over the entire landscape from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific and over a diverse population of newly encountered indigenous 
peoples, new citizens in territories captured from Mexico, and new immigrants.  These 
new peoples had to be incorporated under the umbrella of the state to assert U.S. 
sovereignty over its land and the inhabitants.  In the aftermath, the government began to 
conceive of Native communities less as distinct sovereign nations and more as domestic 
ethnic and racialized communities.   
As the nineteenth century came to an end, federal and local officials began to 
design policy that abandoned the idea that American Indian people were sovereign 
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nations and reconstructed them as chaotic, irrational, and helpless entities that needed to 
be bounded by the state to maintain order.
xlvii
xliv  At the height of the United States’ 
nationalist assertions, policy-makers were attempting to disrupt the membership, identity, 
and land base of Native nations and incorporate their members into the state.  Recent 
scholarship has related how colonial and imperial powers have trapped and incorporated 
indigenous peoples through creating space and enforcing boundaries.xlv  Empires 
incorporated outsiders through the trappings of the state, creating documents like 
censuses and maps to legitimize their presence and to place both people and space under 
surveillance.xlvi Representatives of the United States used all these tactics to impose the 
order of the state onto Native people before the imposition of the reservation system and 
later using the reservation system.  The idea that national formations can easily be seen 
from the outside because they depend on objective criteria has led both political 
representatives of the United States and Western scholars to assume that they can easily 
demarcate distinct American Indian tribal nations.   These classifications have been 
understood as objective because they are based on criteria like language, religion, 
territory, cultural traits, and sometimes even racialized traits.  By imposing these 
boundaries onto Native nations, Western political officials could gain a sense of control 
over peoples who appeared boundless. 
xlviii
Recently, scholars have begun the work of disrupting the naturalized 
constructions of the nation-state, arguing that it emerged as a sociopolitical formation in 
Europe at a specific historical moment.   Because of its origins, the nation-state clearly 
has little relevance to the historical sociopolitical formations of indigenous groups 
separate from their interactions with the United States.  Nevertheless, scholars must be 
wary that their understandings of Native sociopolitical organization do not unwittingly 
duplicate nationalist constructions. In 1967, Morton H. Fried argued that anthropologists 
had been too simplistic in their definition of the term “tribe.”  He took issue with the 
boundaries anthropology had used to separate tribes, declaring that, “most so-called tribes 
seem at close range to be curious mélanges rather than homogeneous units.”xlix  While 
Fried demarcated the terms of this critique, Susan Sharrock illustrated the problems with 
the term “tribe” on the ground.  In her seminal study of Cree and Assiniboine social 
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organization, Sharrock demonstrated that American Indian groups rarely aligned with the 
tribal designations imposed by scholars.  These designations often assumed the group to 
be an ethnic unit, a linguistic unit, a territorial co-residential unit, a cultural unit, and a 
societal unit all at the same time.l  These critiques posed the pivotal argument that social 
units were rarely discretely bounded or coordinated in their membership.  
 Frederick Barth also recognized that scholars fall into dangerous assumptions 
when they accept the naturalness of a given ethnic identity.  Barth warned scholars 
against assuming bounded ethnic identities for Native peoples.  In order to understand 
group formation, he argued, scholars must make studying ethnic boundaries and 
boundary maintenance on Native terms a part of their methodology.li  Barth developed a 
more fluid model of ethnic group formation by describing ethnic groups in relation to 
membership.  He argued that the members of an ethnic group develop the defining 
characteristics of their group themselves but these characteristics are also organized 
through interaction between peoples.  What’s more, group members do not simply define 
themselves in opposition to other peoples, nor does group self-definition depend on 
exclusion or assimilation.  Cultural differences can persist despite interethnic contact and 
even interdependence.lii  Furthermore, important social relations also exist and continue 
across ethnic boundaries and can even be based on differing ethnic identities.liii  The 
categories that are relevant to the members of the group may not be obvious to those 
outside of it.  By exploring the processes involved in generating and maintaining ethnic 
groups, Barth conceived of a distinct group identity that can allow for overlap and 
interaction among groups.  Extrapolating from Barth’s argument, it is apparent that the 
supposedly objective criteria used to distinguish between American Indian groups has 
often not been the way Indian people distinguish themselves.  
Fried elaborated on the idea that ethnic groups formed through interactions with 
outsiders, arguing that tribal organization was a historically specific sociopolitical 
manifestation constructed in response to contact with European states, resulting in the 
deterioration of earlier political formations.liv  Whitehead agrees that tribes are the 
product of the historical violence of European occupation, while groups who come 
together through increased contact and cooperation fall under other categories of ethnic 
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formations.lv  This definition of tribe reveals some of the markers of nation-state 
constructions.  It emphasizes homogenous internal composition and depends on 
solidifying the boundary between the tribe and those outside it.  Furthermore, this notion 
of tribe assumes a dramatic break from previous sociopolitical formations to something 
completely new.  This suggests that tribes emerge from bounded entities that are stable in 
one form, break apart, and form some new bounded entity.  It erases the historical 
continuity of a Native nation, assigning the state with extensive power to undermine non-
state sociopolitical formations.   
Thomas S. Abler describes tribes as tenuously held together by institutions like 
intermarriage, age-grades, or military and religious societies that crosscut primary 
segments like bands.lvi  I argue, on the other hand, that such connections facilitated by kin 
relationships created flexible bonds that actually strengthened a Native nation’s 
solidarity.  Because Native nations exercised sovereignty through kinship channels that 
cut across its own boundaries, these entities had the flexibility to continue to take 
autonomous political action in the face of engagement with the state.  Instead of 
establishing a fragile sociopolitical formation, channels of kin could be constructed and 
activated strategically depending on someone’s needs in the moment.  By maintaining 
multiple kin relationships through intermarriage and societies beyond the family and 
band, every group had numerous channels through which to gain access to land and 
resources, to gather military alliances, and to take refuge in times of crisis.  Such 
practices helped Native nations to maintain their own categories, to assert their own 
economic and political agendas, and to avoid classification by the colonial state.  Every 
state has struggled to differentiate and categorize the ethnic and political groups it 
encounters during encroachment, often because non-state groups maintain this type of 
flexible sociopolitical organization.  Avoiding categorization benefited non-state peoples 
and aided them in asserting autonomy.  While they resisted the categories of the 
colonizers, they were able to continue to order their own world.  Retaining social, 
political, and cultural categories today remains a way that Indigenous people continue to 
assert sovereignty.  
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Imagining tribal nations as culturally unitary, socially connected by political 
institutions, and spatially defined by rigid geopolitical boundaries clearly fails in its 
simplicity.  Although imagining tribes as emerging from specific political and historical 
circumstances might explain shifting sociopolitical institutions within non-state groups 
over time, it does not account for the durability of entire sociocultural entities that 
asserted continuous political autonomy.  The Cheyenne existed as a group despite 
migrations from the Great Lakes to the Plains and the incorporation of outside bands and 
individuals. For this to be possible, this Native nation must have relied on something 
other than the maintenance of rigid social and political boundaries.  To understand the 
ways that such flexible groups asserted a sense of sovereignty, scholars must explore how 
Native self-definition of group identity differed from that of the nation-state.  We also 
must explore where American Indian sovereignty was located historically, how it was 
defined, and how people utilized earlier expressions of sovereignty when faced with 
involuntary engagement with the nation-state.  The realization that state-based 
constructions of tribal nations have misrepresented the historical sociopolitical 
organization of American Indian peoples calls for the development of an understanding 
of American Indian sovereign communal organization that more accurately reflects an 
indigenous understanding.  The idea of Native nationhood allows for flexible political 
expression that does not deteriorate earlier political formations and hence provides a 
deeper understanding of the ways that Native people were able to retain sovereignty on 
their own terms in the face of encroachment and even violence by the nation-state. 
 
Cheyenne Membership and Identity 
 Discarding the idea of the American Indian tribe as unified by a distinct set of 
cultural and political categories begs the question of how Native people established a 
sense of group solidarity and how the group asserted political autonomy.   I propose the 
term “Native nation” to describe the sovereign sense of nationhood that Indian peoples 
asserted.  The paper explores one example of Native nationhood, using Cheyenne social 
organization to illuminate the exercise of sovereignty.  I use the term “Cheyenne” to refer 
to this Native nation throughout because although its organization shifted over time, the 
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people used one term, “Tsistsistas,” to refer to the body of the entire nation.  This term 
was a meaningful category to both members of the nation and other Native nations who 
came into contact with the nation.  I use the term “Cheyenne” because it is easily 
recognizable to any reader and is used to today by both Northern and Southern branches 
of the nation to refer to the entire collectivity.lvii  In order to understand the Cheyenne 
nation as a meaningful entity to its members, we must consider processes of Cheyenne 
membership and its importance to the political exercise of sovereignty.  Ultimately, 
demonstrating that the Cheyenne had their own socially ordered processes to regulate 
their membership, as well as the economic, political, and cultural activities provides 
evidence that the Cheyenne exercised a sovereign sense of nationhood through kinship 
relations.  
lviii
Every Cheyenne person’s identity was marked by several memberships.  A person 
identified with their kindred but was identified in speech by their band affiliation, not 
their camp.   Camps were simply made up of like-minded people, often from several 
kindreds, who lived and worked together, but band identity was determined at birth.  
Sometimes all the members of a camp identified mainly with one band and sometimes the 
members identified with several different bands.  A person could choose a camp, but 
could not choose a band.  Band identity was meaningful in that it marked a person’s place 
in the tribal circle and told others something about that person’s family and history.  
Membership in a military society or the quillworking society was also meaningful in that 
it told others about a person’s personal accomplishments and about the kind of 
responsibilities that he, or occasionally she, had accepted in relation to the Cheyenne 
nation.lix  These memberships established a person’s identity in relation to the whole but 
did not establish an encompassing identity for the whole.      
 The Cheyenne did identify themselves as a whole, but this identity manifested at 
various levels.  Tom Weist stated that in the Cheyenne language the word which names 
their nation means “like us” or “people like us”.lx  Such a description of Cheyenne 
identity could be viewed on the one hand as exclusionary and ethnocentric.  Only those 
like the Cheyenne could be considered part of the nation.  But on the other hand, it has 
inclusionary possibilities because it refers not simply to the biological descendants of 
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Cheyenne people but also to all those like the Cheyenne.  If a person had been around the 
Cheyenne way of living long enough, there could be a possibility this person would be 
considered Cheyenne.  Cheyenneness was therefore a state of being, not based on birth 
and not based on a political organization.  Therefore, Cheyenne identity could fluidly 
incorporate outsiders who had become like the Cheyenne.  Cheyenne identity was not 
simply a way of being; however, it was also an external relationship identified by 
others—both Cheyenne and non-Cheyenne—who recognized a person as Cheyenne.     
 For American Indian people on the plains, a person’s identity at the level of the 
nation could shift during his or her lifetime.  Over time, people both within and outside of 
the nation could recognize a non-Cheyenne as Cheyenne.  Such people were incorporated 
through intermarriage or adoption.  Eventually all those incorporated gained the full 
status of Cheyenne membership.  Moore demonstrated this point, stating: 
Adoptees and captives of all stripes, after a period of residence, became 
citizens of the nation.  According to modern elders, there was no onus of 
“mixed blood” in those years.  Although captives and adoptees were 
sometimes denied certain ritual roles because of their inability to speak 
Cheyenne, their Cheyenne-speaking children were full citizens.  The basis of 
citizenship was not “racial” or biological but was established by birth in a 
Cheyenne band.  In aboriginal times a captive or adoptee was accepted merely 
by consensus of the camp.lxi    
 
lxiii
Moore claimed the Cheyenne had clear-cut distinctions between citizens and non-
citizens.  According to him, at some point, non-Cheyenne incorporated into the nation 
gained full citizenship.lxii  Their previous affiliation remained in collective memory, but it 
did not taint their status as Cheyenne.  It is evident that those who were brought into the 
Cheyenne nation were fully incorporated at some point. Cheyenne today will literally say, 
in the same breath, that their great-grandmother or grandfather was Pawnee or Crow or 
Lakota, and that they are full-blood Cheyenne.   For them, these two statements are not 
contradictory.  Depending on the circumstances, even an enemy could become a full 
member of the Cheyenne nation.  
 Within the nation, Cheyenne identity was not homogenous either.  Collective 
identity for the Cheyenne was not as simple as marking all people who participated in the 
tribal circle and the societies as Tsistsistas.  Every Cheyenne person was considered 
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Tsistsistas or Suhtaio.  The Suhtaio were once considered a separate band.lxiv   Over time, 
however, the Suhtaio became incorporated into the main body of the Cheyenne, but every 
Cheyenne man or woman could still trace ancestry to one group or the other.lxv   This 
identity was, and is still important today, because the two most sacred bundles of the 
Cheyenne that influence the health and welfare of the people belonged in the care of 
these divisions.  The Suhtaio cared for the Sacred Hat and the Tsistsistas cared for the 
Sacred Arrows.  This was an important level of identity that bifurcated the people as a 
whole, but did not divide them in two.lxvi  The divisions of Tsistsistas and Suhtaio 
affected Cheyenne identity at a level above both the bands and the societies but below the 
nation.        
 The terms discussed above marked a collective identity, but it is important to note 
that they did not mark a bounded and unified ethnic identity.  These names were used to 
identify membership in a flexible way.  Names did not confine people to a specific 
membership.  Someone who identified as Cheyenne participated in a certain community, 
lived his or her life in a certain manner, and recognized others who were like-minded.  
Within this community there were several other levels of communal identity, that of the 
kindred, the band, and the society.  Each of these identities was fluid and their 
delineations could change over a lifetime.  A person could join another Native nation 
altogether through marriage, adoption, or captivity and shift their national identity.  The 
flexible nature of this identity established a social organization very different from the 
concept of ethnic or tribal identity placed on Native peoples by scholars, government 
agents, or American popular conceptions. 
lxvii
 Patricia Albers noted that on the plains, for indigenous people, “Ethnicity in the 
generic and highly abstract sense of a ‘tribal’ name did not always function as marker of 
geopolitical boundaries.”   In other words, names like Tsistsistas (as it was used to 
mark the entire sociopolitical body of the nation) did not necessarily mark a stable, 
unified political entity, nor did it mark a homogenous cultural group, nor did it mark a 
nation with a bounded territory, nor did it mark a uniform biological group.  Albers 
continued, stating that for people of the plains, “...ethnic categories did not have a high 
level of salience or any a priori power to organize and distribute people across geographic 
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space.”lxviii  The terms Tsistsistas or Suhtaio imbued a person with an identity that had 
saliency in very specific contexts and relationships.   Nevertheless, these identities were 
not the only factors organizing social relationships or cultural identity.  One’s affiliation 
with a kindred, a band, and a society also shaped his or her social relations and cultural 
identity.  These were fluid categories; they marked people who saw themselves as part of 
a collectivity in the moment it was used.  The members of each group could shift and the 
meaning of the collectivity could shift as well.   
  
Peoplehood as a Way to Conceptualize Native Sovereignty  
In their article reconceptualizing Native concepts of group identity, Tom Holm, J. 
Diane Pearson, and Ben Chavis laid out the theoretical concept of peoplehood.  They 
have argued that a complete understanding of indigenous peoplehood reveals the inherent 
sovereignty of Native groups.  In developing the concept, the authors attempted to move 
beyond the rather ambiguous term “ethnicity” and also to transcend the notions of “state” 
and “nation” as well as “tribe.”lxix   The authors defined the concept of peoplehood in 
terms of four factors--language, sacred history, religion, and land.lxx   They argued that 
each of these factors combine to form the matrix that supports a group’s distinctive 
identity.  The authors noted that scholars and politicians have considered American 
Indian peoples to be pre-states or tribes, and as such, their sovereign status has always 
been questionable in the eyes of the United States.  A peoplehood, on the other hand, 
exists beyond the state.  They stated:  
  A people, united by a common language and having a particular 
ceremonial cycle, a unique sacred history, and knowledge of a 
territory, necessarily possesses inherent sovereignty.  Nations may 
come and go, but peoples maintain identity even when undergoing 
profound cultural change.lxxi  
 
For the authors, the sovereignty of indigenous peoples is not dependent on the state.  A 
peoplehood exists beyond the state, can continue without the state, and at times, in spite 
of the imposition of the state.   
 Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle have also argued that indigenous peoples have an 
inherent sovereignty that exists above the state.  The authors stated that for American 
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Indians, “The idea of the people is primarily a religious concept...” which has its 
beginning in time immemorial.lxxii
lxxiii
lxxiv
   Frequently The People lived together but didn’t see 
themselves as a distinct group until they were instructed through a holy man or other 
figure of cosmic importance and were given ceremonies and rituals.   They noted that 
indigenous peoples point to a moment of origin when the people were united and taught 
how to live.  The Cheyenne themselves point to the moment that Sweet Medicine came to 
the people to teach political organization and religious ceremonies as the genesis of their 
nation.  Previous to this moment, according to oral histories, although the Cheyenne 
existed, they did not exist as a people with a distinct sociopolitical order.  Deloria and 
Lytle argued that all Native people had a clear conception of their own sovereignty, and 
furthermore, these nations controlled specific territories and protected the boundaries of 
these territories from outside intrusion.   
  An indigenous peoplehood, as the above theorists have defined it, constructs 
itself in a way unique from the nation-state.  These scholars have asserted that despite 
their distinction from the state, peoplehoods are inherently sovereign entities comparable 
to the nation.  John Carlos Rowe has demonstrated the diversity and power of 
nationalisms while suggesting that such constructs also have limits and exclusions.  Rowe 
distinguished between nationalisms that are “...aligned with the nation-state and those 
which challenge ‘official’ nationalism.”lxxv  American Indian nations today define their 
own national status according to both of these distinctions.  Many American Indian 
peoplehoods have constructed a tribal nationalism aligned with the nation-state by 
asserting a state sanctioned sovereignty and by adopting some of the structures of the 
state.  Nevertheless, these peoplehoods also challenge official nationalisms by 
maintaining their sovereign sense of cultural identity and utilizing sociopolitical 
formations that exist above and beyond nation-state recognition.  Recognizing 
nationalism as both constructed and diverse has demonstrated that indigenous 
peoplehoods can also be considered sovereign nations, even though they do not always 
align with the nation-state. 
 Native nations in the United States have adopted some of the trappings of the state 
in their efforts to gain the United State’s recognition of their sovereign status.  Vine 
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Deloria and Clifford Lytle recognized that since contact Native ideas of peoplehood or 
nationality have gradually been transformed into ideas that resemble European concepts 
of nationality.  They agreed that Indians adopted a European form of governance to 
survive, but demonstrated that they were also able to retain their own forms of 
governance and the respect for their own laws that had characterized an earlier way of 
self-rule.  Deloria and Lytle stated, “Although they were willing to adopt some of the 
white man’s political institutions, they could not bring themselves to surrender the idea of 
peoplehood that each tribe represented.”lxxvi   Deloria and Lytle demonstrated that 
although Native peoples adopted some state-based institutions, they also retained their 




 To separate the state-based understanding of sovereignty that some Native groups 
have adopted from an inherent sovereignty, Deloria and Lytle distinguished between 
nationhood and self-government.  The authors argued that nationhood “implies a process 
of decision making that is free and uninhibited within the community” and isolated from 
outside factors while it considers its options.    Self-government “implies a 
recognition by the superior political power that some measure of local decision making is 
necessary,” but also implies that the state must always monitor the process.    
Although tribal nations have accepted self-government to a certain extent during the 
twentieth century, I argue that Native peoples have also retained a sovereign sense of 
nationhood as Deloria and Lytle use the term.    
lxxxi
 Holm, Pearson, and Chavis’s concept of peoplehood provides a framework for 
illustrating that the Cheyenne shared an identity based on the cultural formations of 
language, sacred history, religion, and land.lxxx  The Cheyenne people shared a language 
across kindreds and bands and over vast distances.   They shared a sacred history 
embodied in certain central narratives.  In terms of religion, all Cheyenne relied on the 
power of their medicine bundles--the Sacred Arrows and the Sacred Hat--to protect the 
well being of the people.  The Cheyenne also shared a relationship with the landscape, 
pointing to specific places that were connected to their sacred historical narratives and to 
their religious ceremonies, most prominently Bear Butte.  According to this definition, 
the Cheyenne unquestionably were a peoplehood.   For Holm, Pearson, and Chavis, 
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these four elements make a group distinct and give the group sovereignty without the 
state, allowing peoplehoods to maintain identity even in the face of profound change.lxxxii  
This seems simple enough, as long as the language, sacred history, religion, and 
landscape of one peoplehood can be neatly distinguished from those of another.  Of 
course, for indigenous people on the plains, this is seldom possible. 
 None of these four elements indicated a distinct Cheyenne identity by themselves.  
For example, many Lakota people also spoke Cheyenne fluently, some participated in 
Cheyenne religious rituals, the territory of the Lakota and Cheyenne overlapped (for 
example they shared the Black Hills), and both pointed to Bear Butte as a center of 
religious power and even shared some of the same religious narratives. The Cheyenne 
and Lakota had a strong and lasting alliance, but each group certainly understood itself as 
sovereign. These international relationships suggest that Cheyenne nationhood 
historically could not be delineated using the categories that define the concept of 
peoplehood.  The nation was flexible and could not be bounded or defined by these 
factors.  Instead these factors acted in concert, and when shared and tied together by 
kinship, helped to approximate a sense of unity.  Kinship formed the channels through 
which people learned and accessed language, sacred history, religion, and the 
characteristics of their known landscape and its resources.  All these variables formed a 
loose configuration that could be called on at specific moments in time to express unity 
when it was needed.  
 A Native nation, as opposed to a tribal nation or a peoplehood, must be seen as 
not simply shaped by a distinctive language, sacred history, religion, and landscape, but 
instead as shaped by a matrix of relationships with a language, sacred history, religion, 
and landscape that are developed, exercised, and maintained through kinship.  
Furthermore, the term Native nation refers not only to an autonomous cultural identity, 
but an entity that exercises political autonomy through channels created by kin networks.  
Cheyenne and non-Cheyenne could speak the same language, share a landscape, 
participate in the same ceremonies, or even share religious or historical narratives, but 
each element would retain cultural meaning for the group depending on the relationships 
in which it was embedded.  Elements from nations with distinct histories could also be 
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incorporated into the Cheyenne nation without fear of erasing Cheyenneness.  Language, 
sacred history, religion, and landscape reflected something considered Cheyenne through 
their activation, interpretation, and utilization along kinship channels. The people shared 
pieces of all of these with non-Cheyenne, but made the elements Cheyenne by passing 
them on, regulating them, and ordering them through kin relations.      
lxxxiii
 Each of the markers of peoplehood that Holm, Pearson, and Chavis discussed 
were not distinct enough on their own to distinguish a person as Cheyenne, but when 
coupled with the person’s access to each marker through kin relationships, they became 
meaningful.  Even if a person was intermarried or adopted in, he or she still pointed to 
these newly formed kin relationships as evidence of membership and rights to access 
certain landscapes, participate in ceremonies, or relate historical narratives.  Lack of 
relations definitely marked a person as non-Cheyenne.   The Cheyenne obviously saw 
themselves as a distinct group, and the only way to be considered Cheyenne was to be or 
to become a relative.  Shared beliefs about language, sacred history, religion, and land 
were not enough.  Relatedness, however, was not a definitive marker of Cheyenne 
identity either.  Cheyenne people had relatives, especially ones who had joined non-
Cheyenne communities, who were not considered Cheyenne.  
 Holm, Pearson, and Chavis argued that indigenous peoplehoods were and are 
culturally distinct, self-perpetuating, sociopolitical entities, and therefore, are sovereign.  
Because of the flexible nature of plains social organization and membership historically, 
some scholars have found it difficult to pin point exactly how plains peoples were 
sociopolitically and culturally distinct—and therefore sovereign. The point is not to look 
for the binding nature of communal Cheyenne identity, but to understand what it meant to 
call someone or some group “Cheyenne”—when it was used, who it was applied to, and 
why.  Ultimately, Cheyenne communal identity was based on relatedness among people 
that could be sealed by many things, including kinship, language, sacred histories, 
religion, and a connection to a landscape.  These elements could come together in 
different ways.  The combination of elements, their importance as markers, and their 
meanings all shifted over time and from one context to another.  This was the power of 
the Cheyenne nation as a sociopolitical entity.  The concept of Cheyenne identity marked 
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a collective, but eluded definition when approached concretely.lxxxiv   It was flexible and 
could accommodate diverse definitions without any preordained rigidity.  Group 
symbols, language, histories, religion, kin ties, and relationship to land all could be 
invoked to put forth a Cheyenne identity, but none defined or bounded this identity.  
None of these things by themselves bounded or defined the Cheyenne nation, either.   
 
The Centrality of Kinship to the Exercise of Sovereign Native Nationhood 
None of the scholars discussed above delineate how Native peoples exercise a 
sovereign sense of nationhood without relying on the bounded constructions of the nation 
asserted by the state.  Deloria and Lytle’s idea of The People assumes that Native nations 
asserted sovereignty through retaining control over a specific territory.  In this way, they 
rely on state based constructions of sovereignty that depend on establishing boundaries to 
assert control. Although Holm, Pearson, and Chavis’s delineation of the concept of 
peoplehood depends on flexible categories like language, religion, and history, these 
categories must be fixed under this construction to assert a sovereign sense of peoplehood 
because they stand for the language, the religion, the sacred history, and the territory of a 
peoplehood.  This is not to say that Native peoples did not assert a sovereign relationship 
with land or claim a specific membership through a matrix of markers including history, 
religion, and language.  On examination of the political and economic actions of 
American Indian peoples historically, however, it becomes clear that such bounded 
expressions of nationhood cannot account for the multiple and often overlapping 
assertions of sovereignty by Native groups.   
lxxxv
lxxxvi
Historically, American Indian groups rarely asserted sovereignty by neatly 
delineating and then protecting geopolitical boundaries or categorizing members in terms 
of citizenship and maintaining group unity through social contracts.  Benedict Anderson 
has clearly demonstrated that such nation-state constructions are specific to a particular 
historic moment in Western Europe that then is reproduced outside of Western Europe 
under another set of specific historical circumstances.  Furthermore, group identity for 
Plains peoples was defined within a shifting political, economic, and cultural matrix 
rather than fixed categories like language, religion, territory, or other cultural traits.    
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So if Native peoples did not organize politically using the bounded categories constructed 
by the state, but they had a sense of sovereignty recognizable by the first Europeans, how 
did they assert this sovereignty?  Furthermore, how does this sovereignty get expressed if 
not through the maintenance of a set of clearly marked categories?  Using the Cheyenne 
as a case study, this paper suggests that for Native peoples, kinship ordered social, 
political, and economic life and determined a people’s relationship to the landscape and 
its resources; therefore, kinship was central to expressing a sovereign sense of 




In Speaking of Indians, Ella Deloria emphasized the importance of kinship to 
American Indian social life.  She related that all peoples who live communally must find 
a way to with order and harmony.   Deloria stated that historically the Dakota people 
accomplished this through kinship, binding all the members of the community through a 
system of obligations and rewards that followed channels of kin.    She described the 
people as caught up in “a fast net of interpersonal responsibility.”    This net 
organized the way the people interacted, binding them together through reciprocal 
obligations and duties delineated by kin relationships, affecting all aspects of Dakota life.  
Deloria’s description of kin as the organizing element of the Dakota people can be 
instructive in understanding other Native nations as well. The state ordered people 
through an imagined solidarity shaped by allegiance to the polity and articulated the 
relationship between an individual and the collectivity through the transferable and 
homogenous category of citizenship.  Instead Native nations ordered people through kin 
based networks and articulated a person’s place within the collectivity through 
membership based on his or her connections by marriage, blood, and adoption to the vast 
network.  Kin not only organized Native social life, it also affected internal political and 
economic organization and helped to determine the actions that individuals and groups 
took in relation to trade, war, political discussions, and ceremonial life.  
 Eric Wolf has argued that kin based groups institutionalize political power 
through “the management of consensus among clusters of participants.”xc  Political power 
is not established or regulated through national contracts, but instead through the process 
of establishing and maintaining a consensus within the group.  Members take social, 
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political, or economic action by accessing the specific kin ties that will aid them in their 
endeavors.  As Wolf noted, however, these aggregates of kin will disperse again when the 
conditions change, and when new conditions arise, new arrangements will form.xci  As a 
consequence, Wolf stated, “the extension and retraction of kin ties create open and 
shifting boundaries of such societies.”xcii  Despite its flexible nature, however, a Native 
nation still asserted political autonomy in relation to other nations and entities beyond its 
membership.   
xciii
 While Native peoples maintained membership through kin ties within their own 
nation, a person was also embedded in a wide range of social relations with people who 
did not identify with the same nation.  These kin ties could be activated to negotiate 
political and economic action taken in relation to other nations.  For example, plains 
nations often incorporated outsiders through marriage and adoption of both allied and 
enemy plains groups.   This created kinship ties with Plains Indian people who claimed 
different national affiliations.  Native peoples relied on wide-ranging webs of social 
relations that cut across groups when determining access to land and resources or when 
confronted with political or social conflict.xciv Discussing the importance of these 
networks of kin, Patricia Albers and Jeanne Kay stated, “Although American Indian 
populations maintained distinct ethnic identities, unique culture patterns, and even 
differentiated sociopolitical structures, they did so while embedded in geographically far-
ranging and ethnically-mixed systems.”xcv   While Plains nations distinguished 
themselves from others through a distinct matrix of cultural markers and a shared sense 
of solidarity, each one also incorporated people of many different national backgrounds.  
Susan Sharrock demonstrated that, for plains people, the ethnic unit, linguistic unit, co-
residence unit, cultural unit, and societal unit were not discretely bounded and did not 
always correspond in membership.xcvi 
xcvii
Nevertheless, kin ties that stretched across national boundaries did not necessarily 
splinter Native nations.  Instead they regulated political, economic, and social 
relationships between these nations.   Kin ties also connected American Indian people 
to the landscape associated with their sovereign sense of nationhood.  Importantly, 
geopolitical structures on the plains did not rely on borders, but instead used social ties 
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that the people themselves defined.  In Patricia Albers’ discussion of ethnicity on the 
Northern Plains, she argued that groups organized around pluralistic patterns of land use 
and alliance making.  Furthermore, she stated that ethnic categories had little a priori 
power to organize and distribute people across geographic space.xcviii  Instead, social ties 
determined access to land, labor, and resources.xcix   
This historically was certainly true for the Cheyenne.  The nation was 
multilingual, multiethnic, and culturally diverse.  Introducing an interethnic analysis to 
the discussion of Cheyenne history demonstrates that the incorporation of outsiders 
resulted in the complex layering and mixing of ethnicities under the umbrella of the 
sociopolitical body of the Cheyenne nation, resulting in heterogeneous membership.  The 
Cheyenne’s ability to incorporate and assimilate outsiders as members of the nation 
rested on certain dimensions of kin organization.  Establishing beneficial interethnic 
relationships by making new relatives succeeded because the process was based on 
certain shared understandings between Plains peoples that outsiders were incorporated 
through intermarriage and adoption, and that all kin relations engendered obligations.  
Such knowledge transcended both the cultural and sociopolitical boundaries of Plains 
nations.  Interethnic kin relationships acted as the channels through which relations 
between Plains nations took place.c  
 Groups with similar kin organization more readily understood the categories, the 
norms, and the obligations associated with each other’s kin systems.  The Lakota and 
Arapaho kin systems closely resembled the Cheyenne in kin categories and in the 
reciprocal obligations and behavior expected in most relationships.ci  Therefore a 
Cheyenne married among the Arapaho or the Lakota or vice versa could easily and 
quickly respond correctly to the expectations and obligations of his or her new family.  
The peoples of the Missouri River had a different type of kin organization, so an adopted 
or intermarried Cheyenne would have to learn the normative expectations of a different 
kin system.  Establishing interethnic relations demanded certain cultural negotiations that 
varied in complexity depending on the differences between the groups.  Yet each party 
also drew on shared understandings of kin roles and requisite expectations to build the 
relationship.  Everywhere one had a responsibility to his or her family--by blood, by 
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marriage, or by adoption.  Although the specifics of these responsibilities were played out 
in distinctive ways in different communities in all Native nations, reciprocal obligations 
established internal national solidarity and opened channels between nations based on 
kin.       
The Cheyenne used kinship to advance their agency and interests throughout 
Cheyenne history by not only expanding their web of social support through obligation 
engendered by kin ties but also by strengthening ties with allies and creating new ties 
with enemies by establishing or activating kin relationships.  For example, to establish 
foreign trading partners and military alliances at different points in their history, the 
Cheyenne intermarried with the Mandan, Arikara, Kiowa, Arapaho, Teton Sioux, and 
later with Americans.  Large-scale intermarriage created hybrid bands, such as the 
Masikota, Wotapio (Cheyenne/Kiowa), and the Dog Soldier bands (Cheyenne/Lakota), 
that played key roles in Cheyenne history.cii  Often, when a camp of Cheyenne met with 
another camp from another nation for social reasons or for trading, the young men and 
women would court someone from outside their own nation.ciii  When these young people 
married, they reinforced or even established beneficial kin relations across two nations.  
These marriages created channels of kin through which families, bands, or even the 
nation could take strategic political or economic action.   
 The Cheyenne established a wide-ranging and flexible web of social support built 
on kinship.  Using this support, the Cheyenne people were able to journey onto the Plains 
and spread across them, and yet remain a nation.civ  They were also able to create 
multiple alliances with outsiders—through intermarriage and adoption of both allies and 
enemies—and remain a nation.  The flexibility of kinship organization allowed them to 
spread across vast geographic distances and incorporate a wide range of outsiders into 
their families and yet retain a sense of internal solidarity.  In fact, Cheyenne people often 
used kin relationships to gain access to resources, landscapes, and political and military 
support through alliances created by intermarriage with and adoption of non-Cheyennes. 
Therefore, kinship is an essential element in understanding both the exercise of Cheyenne 
sovereignty and the trajectory of Cheyenne history before and after encounters with 
representatives of the United States. 
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Kinship as a Vehicle for Cheyenne Sovereignty 
 Kin relationships established social, political, and economic relationships across 
Native nations through the incorporation of outsiders who could open the channels that 
Native people accessed to take political and economic action, thereby asserting a 
sovereign sense of nationhood.  Native nations utilized channels of kin to come together 
for trade, alliance, war, religious ceremonies, or access to territory. Patricia Albers has 
distinguished three types of interethnic relationships: those “based on war (competition), 
merger (cooperation), and symbiosis (complimentarily).”cv Plains peoples used 
obligations created by kin ties to stabilize these international relationships, to facilitate 
negotiations, and to encourage lasting ties.  By activating obligations, Plains nations 
strategically used channels of kin to pursue their social, political, and economic agenda. 
cviii
 Groups in symbiotic relationships exchanged goods “through established social 
channels created by either marriage or fictive adoption.”cvi Plains peoples understood that 
intermarriage with or adoption of outsiders could open doors to build a politically or 
economically beneficial relationship with communities of different national origins.  Men 
could become conduits for trade through kinship, particularly by adoption.  Patricia 
Albers and Jeanne Kay note that the adoptions that sealed a trade relationship between 
indigenous nations were most often organized as a parent-child relationship.cvii  These 
types of adoptions usually occurred between men, establishing a father-son relationship, 
however, women occasionally participated in the adoptions as well.   When women 
acted as conduits for trade among the Cheyenne, they usually established ties through 
intermarriage with non-Cheyenne men, creating new channels for trade and facilitating 
alliances in trading networks.cix  Mutually establishing a marriage between two different 
groups forged continuing relationships between the peoples.  Therefore, as wives, women 
became human conduits who facilitated contact and encouraged trade between peoples.  
Uterine bands, organized for trade, often encouraged groups of sisters to bring husbands 
in from outside.cx  Chief’s families especially practiced such strategic marriages, 
encouraging young women to marry outside of the nation in a match that would facilitate 
trade.  
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cxiii
 Plains people also established interethnic ties for other purposes, such as military 
alliance.  Patricia Albers stated that merger resembled symbiosis because in both forms 
the two nations used a common territory, unified against shared enemies, collaborated in 
ceremonies, intermarried, and resided together.cxi  Merger, however, “evolved under 
conditions of economic parallelism rather than differentiation.”cxii  Unlike the symbiosis 
between the Cheyenne and the Missouri River nations, which was based on each group 
having access to different goods, merger was based on each group sharing an interest in 
similar resources.  Albers argued that merger was more common on the plains after each 
Plains nation gained direct access to European trade goods.   Plains nations no longer 
relied on each other for trade, but still needed their neighbors to advance and protect their 
mutual land-use rights from outside intrusion.cxiv  Merger created a distinct social form 
only when members of separate nations functioned in most encounters as one political 
economic unit.cxv  This kind of merger did develop in Cheyenne history, particularly with 
the Lakota.  Cheyenne bands, however, also formed alliances with other groups involving 
less incorporation than a full merger, but still based on shared interests in similar 
resources.    
cxvii
cxviii
 Intermarriage frequently sealed relationships between merging bands.  Like 
alliances created for trade, families encouraged marriage with people outside the nation 
to build military alliances.cxvi  Young Cheyenne men and women intermarried 
extensively with Arapaho and Lakota men and women.  According to Albers and Kay, 
interethnic marriages were an institutionalized feature of mergers, necessary to 
establishing the connections that made the joint use of territory possible.   Adoption 
between peoples also helped cement merger relationships.  When two groups wanted to 
establish “a relationship involving continual, reciprocal obligations and sharing, the 
adoption was structured in the manner of a sibling relationship.”   Adoption of a 
sibling linked two people just as parent-child adoption, but the nature of the reciprocal 
obligations was different.  Cheyenne, Lakota, and Arapaho military societies already 
developed brother-brother adoptions among the members within the nation.  To bring 
outsiders into the collectivity, this relationship was simply extended beyond the nation.  
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cxxiii
 Establishing kinship connections with other groups not only helped Plains people 
to form relationships for trade and military alliance, but also aided in gaining access to 
territory and resources.  Many distinct American Indian groups used territories and 
resources jointly.  Although they sometimes shared use rights only for short periods, they 
often based this shared access on stable relationships lasting for generations.cxix  
Although the peoples of the northern plains did not hold land as inalienable and private 
property, each nation certainly controlled access to a certain territory and its resources.  
For example, the Cheyenne placed markers on the landscape indicating that they were 
connected with specific places.cxx  Groups also had a concept of usufruct rights, 
associating certain peoples with the right to use the resources of certain landscapes.cxxi  
On the Northern Plains, there were no geopolitical lines marking where one group’s 
territory ended and another’s began, but “there were social relationships which stipulated 
how groups would separately or jointly occupy a given landscape.”   Groups at war 
usually remained geographically separate, but groups at peace often shared the same 
landscape, regulating access through extensive kinship ties.   In fact, Plains people 
used kin relationships to gain access to resources and territory much more frequently than 





 On the plains, even people at war were bound by social relations and ultimately 
were connected by kin.  Albers described war as a “condition of total competition.”   
She noted that this system of exchange was based on raiding; enemies took horses and 
also captured women and children.cxxv  Both merger and war took place in the absence of 
the specialization that formed symbiotic relationships between neighbors.   Warfare 
was a serious endeavor that affected a nation’s economic and political position on the 
plains.  In historic times, groups not only fought over territory for its ecological features 
and its value for production, but also for the economic advantage the geographic position 
provided in relation to trade.   Warring nations, however, did exchange women and 
children through the practice of captivity.   Captured women and children were then 
incorporated through intermarriage and adoption, creating kin ties even between enemy 
groups.   
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cxxxi
 Unlike the kin ties established by symbiotic or merged groups, interethnic kin ties 
created by war were not meant to establish and maintain relations between two nations.  
The Cheyenne fully incorporated captured women and children, considering them 
Cheyenne once they had become part of a family and particularly once they spoke the 
language.   A group only infrequently activated the kin ties established across plains 
nations by warfare, but these ties did become useful when two enemy groups required a 
peaceful encounter.  For example, two groups at war sometimes attended the same trade 
gatherings and even traded directly with one another on occasion.  Sometimes a nation 
depended on an allied nation to help them trade with an enemy.  For example, the 
Arapaho were able to trade with their enemies the Arikara, using their close allies, the 
Cheyenne, as go-betweens.cxxx  Such an encounter was a delicate undertaking and 
violence could erupt.  Although tensions between enemies were often high, individuals 
could even visit relatives across enemy lines.  These visits were conducted through 
kinship channels created by intermarriage with captive women and adoption of captive 
children.   Captive women and children incorporated into a kindred of an enemy 
nation had the power to open a channel between these enemies at any time. Although 
captivity severed a person’s relationship with their community of origin, the relationship 
could be renewed under certain circumstances for trade, for political negotiation, and 
even to establish peace. 
cxxxii
cxxxiii
 Historically creating connections with non-Cheyenne peoples was not a rare 
occurrence.  The Cheyenne encouraged ethnic mixing.  In fact, the Cheyenne placed a 
high value on exogamous marriages not only outside of the bands but outside of the 
nation as well.    John Moore declared,  “...The Cheyenne nation was predicated not 
on preserving the biological separateness of the population, but on extending and 
hybridizing the nation with other groups.”    Being able to incorporate outsiders 
facilitated establishing beneficial political and economic connections with many different 
communities.  The Cheyenne valued these connections and encouraged their 
establishment.  The participants understood they also might be called to take on the role 
of conduit between the nations.  These relationships were established strategically often 
for political or economic purposes and sealed with the power of reciprocal obligations 
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that a kinship tie demanded.  For the nation-state, the influx of people of other national 
affiliations can be disruptive to the national unity, but incorporation of outsiders at 
different levels did not threaten Cheyenne national stability.cxxxiv  Having multiple, 
widespread allies gained through kin gave the Cheyenne far-ranging political support and 
access to diverse resources.  
     
Conclusion 
 Kinship created the channels through which the Cheyenne exercise sovereignty, 
both internally and internationally. A Native nation approximated a sense of unity by 
maintaining a web of kin-based relationships that could be strategically activated in order 
to take political and economic action and assert rights to resources and territory.  
Therefore, kinship was of the utmost importance when a Cheyenne person took action in 
any situation.  The Cheyenne depended on their web of kin relationships for social, 
economic, ceremonial, and political support.  When a Cheyenne person needed 
something, he or she activated a kin relationship to get it done.  From something as 
simple as borrowing a knife to something as complicated as pledging the Sun Dance or 
rallying a war party, the Cheyenne turned to relatives for help.  They activated the 
appropriate relationships to accomplish political or economic goals, using their social 
knowledge of which relatives were obliged to take on which tasks.  Furthermore, forging 
kinship ties linking peoples on the plains provided an important vehicle for relationships 
between nations.  Remaking Cheyenne bands and camps through intermarriage and the 
incorporation of outsiders did not diffuse the nation, but made it more able to negotiate 
and defend its position on the plains.  In the past, incorporation of members of outside 
ethnic groups facilitated trade, created alliances, and helped to bring peace to warring 
groups.  By incorporating individuals into the kinship system, the Cheyenne could 
reinforce close relationships with outside groups for political and economic purposes.   
 As life on the plains began to change dramatically with the increased American 
presence, Cheyenne people continued to draw on this flexible kin system to help them 
trade for new goods, retain rights to hunting grounds and territory, defend against the new 
enemy of the United States military, and even to establish peace with these American 
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newcomers.  Throughout the nineteenth century, the disruption caused by the American 
presence, first to trade and then to access to territory, did affect Cheyenne social 
organization.  Despite changes in the way kin was organized, the Cheyenne retained a 
kin-based political and social system and deployed it in strategic ways, just as they had in 
the past, to maintain a Cheyenne identity, to order political and economic relationships 
with non-Cheyenne, to maintain their presence in their homeland, and most importantly 
to assert a sovereign sense of nationhood in resistance to the imposition of state-based 
political, geographic, and cultural borders. 
cxxxv
 Holm, Pearson, and Chavis argued that the concept of peoplehood explains the 
resiliency of a group’s sovereignty in the face of colonialism.   These scholars, 
however, have not grappled with how this sovereignty has historically been exercised or 
how the exercise of it facilitated the successful resistance to colonialism.  I argue that 
because Native nations unified around a matrix of cultural institutions passed along and 
accessed through channels of kin, they had a flexibility that allowed them to maintain a 
national identity even in times of dramatic social, cultural, and political change.  By 
contrast, the rigidity of the nation-state makes it susceptible to destruction: if old 
contracts are overthrown and remade by a new power, then the old state disintegrates and 
a new state is formed.  A Native nation, on the other hand, continues regardless of the 
states that rise and fall around it.  It is exactly its flexible nature that provides a Native 
nation with the resiliency to sustain cultural and even political solidarity despite the 
onslaught of colonialism and the imposition of nation-state boundaries. 
 If sovereignty is the establishment and exercise of collective political autonomy, 
clearly Native nations have existed as sovereign entities independent from the nation-
state. By recognizing kinship as an important element in the exercise of Native 
sovereignty, it becomes clear that the state has not had the level of power to absorb and 
subsume outsiders that it has been granted.  In fact, the flexibility and fluidity of 
Cheyenne communal identity resisted a rigid definition which in turn provided the power 
to remain sovereign during the dramatic cultural changes of the nineteenth century, when 
faced with the imposition of fixed nation-state boundaries by the United States.  This 
flexibility also allowed Cheyenne people to retain control over membership and identity, 
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to access land and resources despite encroachment, and even to make and execute 
political decisions in the face of colonialism.  Regardless of colonial efforts at 
containment, as long as Native people could activate kinship channels, they could take 
political action on their own terms.  Certainly through both physical and social violence, 
the state eventually asserted a degree of control over Native nations, but never fully 
subsumed or assimilated them.  Viewing American Indian history from the perspective of 
the Native nation emphasizes a narrative of persistence over resistance and assimilation, 
negotiation over surrender, and the flexibility and sustainability of kinship over the 
rigidity and ultimate fragility of the institutions of the state. 
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